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Mapping Economic Development: The South Seas Government and Sugar 
Production in Japan’s South Pacific Mandate, 1919–1941 
 
Ti Ngo, University of California, Berkeley 
 
Abstract 
 
Japan acquired the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Island chains as a League of Nations 
mandate following World War I. Why did the local administration (the South Seas Government   
or Nanyōchō) heavily subsidize the establishment of a sugar industry? While the South Seas 
Government did not explicitly state why it chose to support the sugar industry despite the wealth 
of oceanic resources surrounding the islands, imperial maps of the South Pacific produced by the 
Japanese navy and the South Seas Government provide a window into how both parties 
envisioned and planned for the economic future of the mandate. These maps included 
information regarding the available natural resources, land, and culture level of the Micronesian 
population. The author argues that in depicting the islands as spaces where a “primitive” 
nonagricultural population failed to take advantage of the islands’ resources, mapmakers and 
officials planned for the mass migration of Japanese labor to the mandate in order to support a 
newly established sugar industry. 
 
Introduction 
At the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Japan acquired Germany’s former colonies north of the 
equator as a League of Nations Class C Mandate. This consisted of the Mariana, Caroline, and 
Marshall Island chains, comprising two thousand islands with a land area of 687 square miles 
(see figure 1). Under the terms of the mandate, the Japanese government was charged with 
guiding and preparing a population of forty thousand Micronesians along a perceived unilinear 
path of development toward a stage when eventual self-rule would be possible (South Seas 
Government 1930, 1). Prior to the incorporation of the islands into Japan’s burgeoning overseas 
empire, however, these islands had not received much attention since the middle of the 1880s, 
when naval officers such as Enomoto Takeaki and writers such as Shiga Shigetaka stirred the 
public imagination about the possibilities of Japanese expansion into the Southern Pacific 
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(Peattie 1988, 7–9). In 1882 and 1883 expeditions, Enomoto Takeaki had sought to explore the 
region around the Caroline Islands in the hopes of finding unclaimed islands for Japan to 
colonize. Enomoto disappointingly found that the islands in the South Pacific had already been 
claimed by European powers, such as Germany. The failure to find unclaimed land, the relatively 
long distance between Micronesia and the Japanese archipelago, and the increasing focus on 
Korea as a strategic interest precluded the South Pacific as a site for Meiji expansion. 
 
Figure 1. Map of Japan’s South Pacific mandate. This comprised the former German colonies north of the 
equator. Source: Blakeslee (1922, 102). 
 
 
 
 Yet, by virtue of participating in World War I on the side of the Allied Powers, Japan 
serendipitously acquired the Micronesian islands north of the equator as a League of Nations 
mandate in 1919. The acquisition of the islands posed issues for Tokyo and the new local 
administration, the South Seas Government, or Nanyōchō. How should Japan govern this 
territory, given that it was not legally a colony? How could these islands serve Japanese national 
interests? 
 Because the South Pacific had become a peripheral interest to Japanese leaders following 
the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) over Chinese influence in Korea, maps of the region 
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remained scant prior to World War I.i One of the first tasks of the South Seas Government was to 
systematically map the new territories under Japanese jurisdiction. An extensive cartographic 
and cadastral survey was conducted with results published in 1922. 
 Maps, as Thongchai Winichakul and others have pointed out, function as political 
instruments in concretizing the imagined nation-state into a geographical and physical projection 
on the earth’s surface. Thongchai writes, “The geo-body of a nation is a man-made territorial 
definition which create effects—by classifying, communicating, and enforcement [sic]—on 
people, things, and relationships” (1994, 17). Maps, however, are not only useful historical 
sources in portraying claims about territoriality and the content of the national body. Maps, 
Thongchai argues, also represent “a kind of knowledge, a conceptual abstraction of a supposedly 
objective reality, a systematic set of signs, a discourse” (1994, 18). 
 Maps of the South Pacific produced by the South Seas Government in conjunction with 
the Japanese navy were necessary at the outset for logistical reasons. Only through making the 
space knowable could the South Seas Government begin to plan for the future of the islands, 
particularly regarding how land should be used, what type of infrastructure to build and where, 
as well as how the islands could serve the geopolitical interests of the empire. Mapmakers, 
however, did not simply limit themselves to cartographic representation of the islands. Within 
the maps, the South Seas Government and the Japanese navy assessed the economic viability of 
the islands. They discussed the islands’ natural resources and climate, along with the culture of 
the native Micronesian population. Despite the guise of an objective presentation, the description 
of the natural resources and human capital of the islands reflects how the South Seas 
Government was considering what type of policies could be implemented in the mandate. In 
addition, maps were used as tools to gather information about available land while ignoring 
Micronesian claims over communal land used by villages. By erasing the territory inhabited by 
the native Micronesian population, these maps depicted the islands as empty tracts of 
undeveloped land that could be exploited by Japanese immigrant labor and capital investment in 
sugar production. Moreover, mapmakers and the South Seas Government portrayed the native 
Micronesian population as lacking the agricultural skills to supply the future labor force for the 
islands. Instead, the South Seas Government and the South Seas Developmental Company chose 
to exclusively hire Japanese famers. Imperial maps thus functioned not only as repositories of 
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knowledge about the islands but also as documents that showed how the South Seas Government 
believed the islands could be economically developed, given the available resources. 
 
Developmental Choices and International Regulations 
 In 1914, Britain called on Japan to help rid the waters around Asia of German U-boats. 
Under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, Japan was able to enter World War I on the side of 
the Allied Powers.ii The Japanese navy went beyond Britain’s request and quickly occupied the 
German colonies of the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands. Because German U-boats and 
personnel had already been recalled to the European theater, the Japanese navy faced no 
resistance upon landing on the islands. At Versailles, Japan’s proximity to the South Pacific 
allowed Tokyo to press demands for the islands to be transferred to Japan as a result of its role in 
the war. Yet the nascent League of Nations’ mandate system precluded the direct transfer of 
territory from losers to victors. According to Article 22 of the League of Nations’ covenant, 
territories were to be prepared for future political independence by “advanced nations who by 
reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this 
responsibility” (1921). After much diplomatic wrangling between Japan, Australia, the 
Netherlands, and the United States about how to divide Germany’s former colonies in the 
Pacific, Tokyo eventually procured the islands as a League of Nations Class C mandate. 
 Class C mandates were reserved for territories that were deemed by the league to lack the 
history of economic and political development that would enable their people to establish self-
rule. In comparison to Class A or B mandates, Class C mandates allowed for greater control of 
the territory by the mandate power, to the point that these mandates could be governed as 
“integral portions of its [the mandate power’s] territory” (League of Nations Covenant 1921).iii 
In 1921, Viscount Uchida, the foreign minister to the league, grandly proclaimed, “It is the 
determination of the Japanese government to spare no efforts in the discharge of this noble 
mission of civilization, in promoting the welfare and development of the people of this territory” 
(Decker 1940, 46). 
 Yet the mechanism by which mandate powers such as Japan were to prepare those living 
in the mandates for future independence remained unclear. Moreover, while Japan had to submit 
annual reports to the League of Nations’ Permanent Mandate Commission (PMC) regarding 
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economic production, taxes, native population, and the like, the league lacked any concrete 
enforcement mechanism to measure progress or punish mandate powers for the lack thereof. In 
her work on the PMC, Susan Pedersen has aptly pointed out that the PMC was virtually 
“toothless.” Although ostensibly staffed by ten members who were known for their competence 
and were outside of government employ, in reality, the members were former colonial officials 
with close ties to their respective national governments. Pedersen noted that they “behaved less 
as international watchdogs than as government mouthpieces, defending their own nation’s 
colonial record and trying to expose the failings of other powers” (2005, 115). Furthermore, 
complaints regarding a mandate power’s negligence would have to be reported to the Council of 
the League for further deliberation.iv The inefficiency of the PMC and the league essentially gave 
the mandate power the ability to stall or silence any complaint by the native population or 
observers. Regarding the mandate system, the anti-imperialist George Padmore in 1937 
castigated the PMC as a “huge fraud” that was devised by the imperial powers to expand their 
empires while “creating the illusion that they were really annexing these territories as spoils of 
war” (Pedersen 2005, 113–115). 
 With the lack of serious oversight by the PMC, Tokyo and the South Seas Government 
were given a free hand to operate in the South Pacific. Yet stipulations against building 
fortifications on the islands meant that Japan could not use the islands as strategic bases for naval 
warfare.v Moreover, because Japan was dependent on the international loan market in London 
for financing its expenditures, it could ill afford to alienate the United States and the great 
European powers by transgressing the prohibition on base construction (Metzler 2006). Thus, 
Tokyo and the South Seas Government had to find another means to make the islands useful. 
 The history of economic development by colonial powers in the Marshall, Caroline, and 
Mariana Islands prior to Japanese rule is characterized by a lack of investment or involvement. 
The islands were first brought to the attention of Europeans in the late 1600s by Spanish sailors 
who claimed them as colonies for Spain. Geographically distant from Spain’s colonies in South 
America, the islands were left to missionaries, whalers, and traders without the presence of a 
local administration. The lack of a strong colonial government continued when Spain sold the 
islands to Germany in 1899 for 25 million pesetas (Hexel 1995, 6). For Germany, the islands 
were more a source of prestige to bolster the state’s credentials as an imperial power than a 
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possession of economic or strategic importance. The paucity of German government personnel 
on the islands was such that when the Japanese navy landed on the islands in 1917, its sailors 
simply accepted the surrender of the territories from a handful of missionaries without a single 
shot being fired. 
 Given the location of the islands and the relatively small amount of available land, it was 
not inconceivable that Tokyo and the South Seas Government would inject funds to 
economically develop the islands. After all, the islands were de jure international mandates 
rather than outright colonial possessions. In addition, there had been discussion in the National 
Diet in the aftermath of Japan’s acquisition of Taiwan about selling the islands to France for 100 
million yen because of the potential cost to the Japanese treasury of funding their administration 
and subduing the remaining anti-Japanese resistance (Chang and Meyers 1963, 435). In 1920, 
there was a distinct possibility that the Micronesian mandate would not attract intense Japanese 
capital investment. 
 As for Japanese industry on the islands, prior to 1919, the Japanese presence was 
minimal. Japanese workers on the islands were either short-term contractual labors working in 
mines owned by Western companies or small-time traders who sold Japanese goods to native 
Micronesians in exchange for copra. For example, in 1891, the Paris Nickel Company hired the 
Nippon Yoshisha Company to recruit six hundred Japanese laborers to work at a nickel mine in 
New Caledonia (Purcell 1967, 16–24). Trading companies, on the other hand, focused on selling 
Japanese goods and buying what was locally produced in the area. Within Micronesia, this type 
of business model was exemplified by the South Seas Trading Company. Established in 1908 
through the merging of the Hiki South Seas Trading Company and Murayama South Seas 
Trading Company (Nanyō Bōeki Kabushiki Kaisha) continued the model of small-scale trade 
through branch stores. According to Mark Peattie, these stores usually consisted of a house, 
store, and warehouse with a customs office and bath in the rear. The company sold Japanese 
goods to the natives and imported items such as copra, seashells, and tortoise shells (Peattie 
1988, 101–102; Yanaihara 1940, 26). 
 While the islands would be known for intense sugarcane cultivation in the 1920s, before 
formal acquisition by Japan, the history of Japanese sugar production was beset by failures. In 
1914, Nishimura Ichimatsu sought to take advantage of the high price of sugar brought about by 
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World War I by establishing a sugar plantation on Saipan. Recruiting laborers from his father’s 
factories in Yamaguchi and Nagasaki along with four hundred Korean workers, Nishimura 
gathered 300,000 yen to purchase the land and build a refinery, forming the Nishimura 
Development Company (Nishimura Takushoku Kaisha) in the process. However, Nishimura’s 
and the workers’ lack of expertise doomed the project. His laborers, both Japanese and Korean, 
had difficulty clearing the land since many had expertise and experience in the fishing industry 
rather than in agriculture. Moreover, their lack of knowledge about the refining process meant 
that most of the cane sugar rotted and had to be poured into the sea. Further weakened by 
quarrels between the Japanese and Korean laborers, Nishimura’s enterprise flopped after a year 
and was abandoned. The other company operating on the island was the South Seas Industrial 
Development Company (Nanyō Shokusan Kabushiki Kaisha). It brought three hundred 
individuals from the Ogasawara Islands to begin farming sugarcane on Saipan. Plagued by 
disease among the farmers as well as the crop, this venture also quickly failed. David Purcell 
notes that established sugar companies on Taiwan, such as the Greater Japan Sugar Company 
and Meiji Sugar Company, initially considered the possibility of developing sugar in Micronesia 
but eventually decided that the size of the islands made the profits not worth the risk (Purcell 
1967, 26–29). 
 Tezuka Toshiro, the first head of the South Seas Government, pondered what to do with 
the new territories in 1920 (Peattie 1988, 126–127).vi Introduced to Matsue Haruji,vii an 
entrepreneur who believed that the islands had the requisite climate to make sugarcane 
production profitable, Tezuka and the South Seas Government decided to subsidize Matsue’s 
plans to lay the groundwork for a sugar industry in the South Pacific. With the financial aid of 
the South Seas Government, Matsue established the South Seas Development Company (Nanyō 
Kōhatsu Kabushiki Kaisha, or Nankō) in 1922. The South Seas Development Company received 
significant aid from the local administration. After conducting a land survey, which categorized 
223,295 acres as government land, 74,431 acres was leased to private firms, with the South Seas 
Development Company being the main beneficiary.viii Financially, the subsidies given to the 
South Seas Development Company were substantial, amounting to an average of 260,660 yen 
per year over a ten-year period (1922–1931). In light of the South Seas Government’s average 
annual budget of 4.76 million yen over the same period, sugar subsidies represented a significant 
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5.47 percent of its total expenditures (Nanyōchō 1932, 305). Sugar, not surprisingly, became the 
leading industry on the islands. From 71,930 yen in 1922, the value of the sugar industry grew 
exponentially, to 6,784,853 yen in 1930 and 12,994,322 yen in 1936. In 1926 and 1930, sugar 
alone accounted for over 50 percent of the total value of exports from Micronesia, surpassing the 
value of phosphate, bonito, and copra exports combined (Nanyōchō  1936). 
 Why did the South Seas Government decide to support sugar production on the islands 
given the history of failure?ix Tezuka Toshiro and the South Seas Government never explicitly 
explained why they decided on using the islands to uniquely produce sugar. However, an 
analysis of maps of the South Pacific produced by the Japanese navy in conjunction with the 
South Seas Government sheds light on the reasons behind the policies the South Seas 
Government implemented. The portrayal of the South Pacific mandate in maps as a region with 
an amenable climate and ample land engendered a belief that, with investment, the islands could 
become a lucrative source of sugar production and Japanese settlement. 
 
Mapping Economic Development in the South Pacific 
 Prior to the occupation of the South Pacific by the Japanese navy in 1914, serious 
cartographic surveys of the islands had not been undertaken. A series of maps was made by the 
navy in conjunction with the South Seas Government by 1922. These maps were subsequently 
reproduced in 1938.x Many of these maps were topographical, showing the elevation of the 
various mountains on the islands while detailing the sea level around the islands. They also 
highlighted the administrative area that fell under the South Seas Government’s jurisdiction in 
contrast to the islands farther south, which comprised the Australian government’s mandate (see 
figures 2 and 3). These maps also contained accompanying texts describing the geography, 
peoples, economy, and climate of the islands.xi Maps of the South Pacific not only provided the 
South Seas Government with knowledge of the physical environment but also presented a 
window into how the islands’ potential—in terms of natural resources, human capital, and 
climate—were viewed. The maps of the South Pacific provide a unique case study for 
understanding how mapping and subsequent policy making occurred. 
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Figure 2. Map of Ponape Island in the Caroline Islands chain. Source: Nihon rikuchi sokuryō (1938). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Map of the South Pacific mandate with accompanying sketches of views of the islands from the 
sea. Source: Nihon rikuchi sokuryō (1938). 
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 Imperial maps reoriented viewers toward expanding southward rather than into Northeast 
Asia. Within the history of Japanese imperial expansion, the army and navy debated the merits of 
northern expansion (hokushin) into Northeast Asia versus southern expansion (nanshin) into 
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.xii Favoring a policy of southern expansion, the navy saw 
Taiwan and the South Pacific mandate as a stepping-stone for Japanese expansion into Southeast 
Asia. Maps of the South Pacific supported these views (figure 4). In a 1938 map featuring the 
South Pacific mandate, the viewer’s perspective is shifted from locating Japan near continental 
Asia to locating it as an island empire within the Pacific. Red shipping lines on the map 
highlighted the connection between the mandate and major ports within the empire, from 
Yokohoma to Taipei. The map also included shipping lines to the Philippines and Papua New 
Guinea, a feature not found in 1922 maps. In reframing the mandate and Japan to show 
connections to Southeast Asia, the South Seas Government and navy supported arguments for 
southern advancement. Advocates of nanshin referred to the islands as Japan’s “southern 
lifeline” (minami no seimeisen).xiii Matsue Haruji, the founder of the South Seas Development 
Company, shared their views: 
 
Ever since Japan was given the mandate over the Nanyō Islands...Japan’s relation with 
the greater South Seas (Dai Nanyō) has fundamentally changed, and our country is 
currently in a most favorable position with regard to our interests in the New Guinea 
region, which lies in those expansive reaches. (1932, 3) 
 
In his use of the term “Dai Nanyō,” Matsue was referring to Southeast Asia, which offered 
potential areas for further colonization and development.xiv 
 In the accompanying textual descriptions of natural resources, imperial maps of the South 
Pacific also provide a window into how the South Seas Government viewed the economic 
possibilities of the region based on its current state. For Tezuka and other planners in the South 
Seas Government, Taiwan served as a model from which to compare and plan the economic 
future of the islands. From a drain on the imperial treasury in its first years, colonial Taiwan had 
become financially self-sufficient in 1905 (Chang and Myers 1963, 446). By developing the 
cultivation of sugarcane and rice, which together comprised roughly 60 percent of the total value 
of Taiwanese exports from 1920 to 1930, the colonial government was able to improve the 
economic productivity of the island while securing its operating revenue through taxes (Ka 1995,  
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Figure 4. Enlarged portion of a 1938 map of the South Pacific depicting the shipping lines from the 
mandate to other ports in the empire and Southeast Asia (Nihon rikuchi sokuryō 1938). Red lines indicate 
shipping routes; wavy lines represent underwater telegraph lines. 
 
 
 
64). In particular, sugarcane cultivation and sugar production increased dramatically under 
Japanese investment.xv The colonial government in Taiwan pushed for the monopolization of 
sugar production under Japanese hands. In 1905, it divided sugarcane fields into districts based 
upon their proximity to a sugar-processing plant. These procurement districts were under the 
purview of a government-favored sugar company. Farmers were required to sell all of their 
sugarcane to the company to which the district was assigned. In return, the colonial government 
and sugar companies would set a price at which all sugarcane grown for the year would have to 
be purchased by the assigned company. This effectively created a state-sponsored sugar 
monopoly in the hands of the Mitsui, Mitsubushi, and Nitō conglomerates (zaibatsu). 
Interestingly, in contrast to sugar production in Western colonies, the Japanese colonial 
government in Taiwan eschewed the establishment of sugar plantations in which the company 
owned the land and controlled the growing, harvesting, and processing of the sugar.xvi Instead, 
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the colonial government allowed for small families to own land while securing supplies of 
sugarcane by contracts and laws requiring land designated for sugarcane cultivation to grow the 
necessary sugarcane to supply factories. As Yanaihara Tadao, economist and expert on Japan’s 
colonies, wrote in 1929, “The development of Japanese imperialism in Taiwan centered on sugar 
production” (Ka 1995, 64–65, 74, 110). 
 In reflecting on colonial policies in Taiwan, the South Seas Government believed that a 
similar approach could be adopted in the South Pacific mandate. In fact, the description of the 
islands on maps of the mandate suggest that the South Seas Government thought that they 
presented even more ideal conditions for sugar production than Taiwan. In a set of 1938 maps, 
the South Pacific was portrayed as a tropical region that was more temperate and suffered from 
fewer ailments than other regions near the equator. Mapmakers wrote that “the climate in the 
[South Pacific] islands is comparatively good,” while the number of diseases is few (Nihon 
rikuchi sokuryō 1938). Moreover, the record prices of sugar on the world market provided an 
incentive to invest in sugar production on the islands. In 1920, the price of sugar reached a high 
of 0.20 yen per kilogram in comparison to the average price of 0.06 yen per kilogram during the 
early 1910s and throughout the 1920s (Ka 1995, 117). In addition, in contrast to Taiwan, where 
farmers had clearly delineated plots of lands and a complicated system of land tenure, the native 
Micronesian population did not farm in the conventional manner recognizable to Japanese and 
Western observers at the time.xvii Rather than clearing and delineating plots of land, 
Micronesians engaged in small-scale agriculture, particularly the cultivation of fruit trees at 
varied locations in the communal land near their villages. In their land survey, the South Seas 
Government perceived the islands’ land as being unclaimed as well as wastefully underutilized 
by the native population. The high price of sugar, hospitable climate, and unclaimed land 
provided incentives for developing a sugar industry on the islands following the Taiwanese 
model. This entailed close cooperation between the local administration and a state-sponsored 
company (in this case the South Seas Development Company). However, economic development 
in the South Pacific mandate was not simply a replica of the colonial Taiwanese economy. The 
perceived lack of conventional agriculture on the islands and views regarding the adequacy of 
the Micronesian population to farm fundamentally shaped how the South Seas Government and 
the South Seas Development Company developed the islands. 
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 Maps and land surveys played a large role in the economic planning for the islands by 
determining the amount of land available for use. Through maps and land surveys, the South 
Seas Government acquired ownership over the majority of land on the islands. Maps produced in 
1922, 1938, and 1940 demarcated land owned by private firms or the government. Notably, 
within these numerous maps, the lands on which the native Micronesian population lived were 
not represented. However, land used by the South Seas Government or the South Seas 
Development Company was included. For example, a map of Pelelieu Island in 1940 delineated 
land leased to the South Seas Development Company as well as that of the military barracks and 
airfield (see figure 5). The Micronesian population living on the island at the time, however, is 
omitted. 
 
Figure 5. Image of Pelelieu Island in the Caroline Islands. Source: Nihon rikuchi sokuryō (1938). 
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 The effect of this erasure was twofold. First, because the Micronesian population used 
communal lands that were not documented, the initial cartographic surveys in 1923 by the South 
Seas Government registered these lands as unclaimed and unused. As mentioned above, the 
Class C status of the mandate enabled the South Seas Government to govern the territory as if it 
were contiguous with the laws within the empire. The Natural Resources Law in place in Japan 
at the time divided land into domains for public use, government use, forestry, and miscellaneous 
use. The law also stipulated that “all real property without owners now belonged to the state” 
(South Seas Government 1924, 92–94). When applied to the South Pacific mandate, this law 
enabled the South Seas Government to secure 223,295 acres (273,948,093 tsubo) as government 
land. The native population and Japanese farmers owned 53,197 acres (65,265,143 tsubo) and 
6,074 acres (7,452,201 tsubo) of the land, respectively. The South Seas Government leased 
74,431 acres to private firms, with the South Seas Development Company being the main 
beneficiary of rent-free land for development (Nanyōchō 1932, 333–334).xviii The erasure of a 
large portion of communal land used by Micronesian villages in both the land survey and maps 
effectively disenfranchised the population and allowed for subsequent immigration of large 
numbers of Japanese farmers. 
 In addition, the maps depicted empty and unused lands that the South Seas Development 
Company could offer to potential Japanese immigrants. Like Manchuria, the South Pacific 
mandate was portrayed as a frontier, containing vast undeveloped tracts of land for Japanese 
farmers to move into (Young 1998, 327). The South Seas Development Company offered 
farmers who immigrated with their families 12.25 acres of land to farm sugarcane, with all the 
products to be sold to the company. Twenty percent of the sugarcane would be paid as a leasing 
fee (Decker 1940, 181).xix This promise of undeveloped land enticed Japanese immigrants, many 
of whom were impoverished Okinawan farmers. 
 The power of land surveys and maps to wrest land and redivide it for the benefit of the 
empire supported plans for overseas migration. The industrialization of cities and the growing 
number of factories in the countryside created income inequality in the Japanese countryside. 
Imperial Diet members and others, however, believed that this unequal distribution of wealth 
was due to overpopulation. In her research on Japanese emigration to Korea, Hyung Gu Lynn 
notes that from 1887 onward, there was a belief in Japan that the home islands were 
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overcrowded and that emigration was necessary (2005, 26–27).xx This fear that a Malthusian 
crisis was responsible for unemployment in the countryside led Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō 
in 1909 to present a plan of sending one million Japanese immigrants to Manchuria within 
twenty years. Expansion and emigration, as Louise Young argues, was also seen as a cure for the 
economic inequality in the countryside through the opening up of land overseas for impoverished 
Japanese farmers (1998, 308–316). 
 Among the various destinations available for Japanese immigrants, the South Pacific 
offered advantages over other sites. Because the islands were under Japanese jurisdiction, 
immigrants were not subjected to racial discrimination, immigration quotas, or rule by a foreign 
government. In addition, the amount of land offered in contracts by the South Seas Development 
Company surpassed those of Taiwanese sugar companies. In colonial Taiwan, the amount of 
available land for migrants was limited by the large number of Taiwanese farmers already on the 
island and the history of land tenure there. The erasure of communal land used by the 
Micronesian population offered the local administration and the South Seas Development 
Company the bulk of arable land on the islands. Furthermore, whereas in Manchuria and Taiwan 
Japanese settlers would have to compete with Chinese labor, which was cheaper than Japanese 
labor, Japanese migrants to the South Pacific did not face competition from Micronesian workers 
because the South Seas Development Company exclusively hired Japanese workers to farm 
sugarcane. 
 Many of the farmers who moved to the South Pacific mandate were Okinawans. Despite 
a boom in sugar prices during World War I, the depressed prices of sugar on the international 
market during the 1920s hurt the sugar industry on Okinawa, leading many Okinawans to look 
for better economic opportunities elsewhere. Chōdō Matsujirō, a farmer who emigrated from 
Okinawa to Saipan in 1922, said: “At the time, my family was poor and I couldn’t enter the 
upper school so my ambition was to set off to seek my fortune [hitohata] in an undeveloped 
[mikai] land” (Tomiyama 1993, 55–56). In his interview with Japanese who had settled in the 
Nanyō, Abe Goe notes that one informant mentioned that “many talked about going north or 
south as it would become difficult to live in Japan” (1986, 172). Many of the early Okinawan 
immigrants to the South Pacific were men who came with dreams of making a fortune. Many 
thought of settling in the South Pacific only temporally. After the Great Depression, however, 
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the number of Japanese immigrants increased, with a majority taking their families along, 
thereby creating a more settled community on the islands. 
 Although wages for immigrant farmers in the South Pacific were only 40 to 50 percent of 
that of their counterparts in Tokyo, the contracts between the South Seas Development Company 
(Nankō) and immigrant farmers provided a better economic prospect than those found on 
Okinawa. Nankō’s workers can be divided into three categories. According to John Decker, all 
agreed to pay the company back for the 30-yen moving expense. Those engaged in the sugar mill 
were given free lodging and a rent-free plot of land. They were paid twice a month at the average 
rate of 1.88 yen per day. The second class of workers consisted of farmers who were provided 
with 3.65 acres. They were also called upon periodically to work in the sugar-processing plant, 
thereby providing a floating pool of labor for the mill. The last group consisted of farmers who 
came with their families. Referred to as 5-cho farmers, these individuals were assigned 12.25 
acres. Twenty percent of their crop would have to be paid to Nankō as a leasing fee (Decker 
1940, 29–31). While the working conditions and wages in the sugar industry were not high, they 
were supplemented by government subsidies given to farmers for growing sugarcane. For 
example, this included 30 yen for every newly cleared hectare that was planted with sugarcane. 
In 1929, 1,121 Japanese workers were given subsidies in the amount of 513,664 yen. The 
resulting package of subsidies and stable work enticed farmers from Okinawa to emigrate despite 
the exploitative terms offered by the South Seas Development Company. As a result, the number 
of Japanese immigrants to the South Pacific grew exponentially over the next two decades. 
Whereas in 1920, 3,671 Japanese lived on the islands, by 1941, this number had risen to 90,072 
persons, almost double the native population of 51,089 persons (Nanyōchō 1932, 332–333).xxi 
 Why did the South Seas Government and Nankō preferentially hire Japanese to farm 
sugarcane on the islands when Micronesian labor offered a cheaper alternative? Once again, 
maps suggest an answer. The description of Micronesians, particularly the Kanaka, in maps 
reflected a belief by the navy and South Seas Government that Micronesians were inherently less 
advanced than Japanese or other colonial subjects. Maps published in 1938 included texts 
describing the native population as lacking industry. Dividing Micronesians into two groups, the 
Kanaka and the Chamorro, the maps characterized the Kanaka as being dark skinned and 
“disliking normal work.” The writer goes on to state that “the majority of the Kanaka have not 
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been able to advance beyond a primitive state” (Nihon rikuchi sokuryō 1938). Although the 
Chamorros were deemed to be relatively more “advanced” than the Kanaka, they were 
nevertheless criticized for having religious practices that focused on animism (literally the 
worship of “plants and animals”). 
 In order to develop the productive potential of the islands, Micronesians could not be 
depended on to provide the workforce.xxii This perception pushed the South Seas Government to 
solicit Japanese to immigrate to the islands. In its official history, the South Seas Government 
stated: 
 With regard to the aforementioned idea of islanders engaged in agricultural production, it 
is not possible to improve their current low level overnight. Rather, the island’s 
development has been concretely tried through the immigration of Japanese farmers. This 
has been one enlightened [keihatsu] method. In 1924, more land has been set aside and 
Japanese immigrants have been invited [to work on said land]. (1932, 290) 
 
Matsue, the president of the South Seas Development Company, viewed Micronesians in the 
same light. Reflecting in 1932, he argued that “looking among the islands, there were no 
individuals who had experience [growing or working in the sugarcane industry]” (1932, 80). In 
addition to Micronesians’ unsuitability for farming, Matsue wrote, “within Japan, the most 
overcrowded region was Okinawa so that hiring them for work on Saipan was the appropriate 
measure” (1932, 82). For Matsue, preferentially hiring Okinawans conferred various advantages. 
First, Okinawan labor was cheaper than that of Japanese on the main islands. Moreover, 
Okinawans had experience in sugar cultivation. Lastly, hiring Okinawans allowed Matsue to 
claim a role in alleviating the perceived problem of overpopulation on the main islands. As a 
result, contractual sugarcane cultivators hired by Nankō were predominantly Japanese. 
According to official government statistics, in 1930, 37,761 acres of land had been leased to 
Japanese in contrast to the 239 acres leased to Micronesians (Nanyōchō 1932, 334). In 1929, 
1,121 Japanese workers were given subsidies totaling 513,664 yen, compared to 1,266 yen 
spread among 27 Micronesians. Unlike colonial subjects in Taiwan and Korea, Micronesians 
were never fully mobilized in the economy of the mandate until their labor was required in the 
desperate days of preparing for the U.S. invasion. 
 With their descriptions of the resources and people of the region, maps of the South 
Pacific were tools of power to make the space of the mandate both knowable and controllable. 
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The land was quantified and requisitioned for the development of a sugar monopoly by the South 
Seas Government and Nankō. In addition, the texts included on these maps reveal how the South 
Seas Government and navy viewed the economic possibilities of the islands through an analysis 
of climate, geography, and the culture of the native Micronesian population. By depicting 
Micronesians as primitive and lacking industry, these maps contained justifications for the South 
Seas Government and Nankō’s policy of encouraging Japanese migration to the islands. 
 
Conclusion 
 As historical sources, Japanese imperial maps have often been overlooked by historians 
and other scholars as potential sources for understanding the Japanese empire. As tools for the 
expression of state power, imperial maps make a space knowable not only through cartographic 
representation but by imparting views about what resources are available and how they can be 
utilized. In the case of the South Pacific, these maps reflected a regime that sought to utilize land 
in order to make the mandate economically productive. Maps helped further these aims in 
designating ownership of land and how space could be divided. The enforcement of the Natural 
Resources Law increased the amount of land available for the South Seas Government while 
ignoring communal lands used by Micronesians. Maps and land surveys paved the way for the 
establishment of a successful sugar industry on the islands. By 1930, sugar accounted for over 50 
percent of the total value of exports and provided over 60 percent of the tax revenue collected by 
the South Seas Government (Nanyōchō 1932, 50). Not surprisingly, the mapmakers claimed that 
sugar production on the islands would have a long future (Nihon rikuchi sokuryō 1938). 
 In their erasure of Micronesian rights over communal land, imperial maps of the South 
Pacific served as tools for the South Seas Government to assert control over a geographic area. 
In this sense, they facilitated what Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Peluso called the “internal 
territorialization of state power” (1995, 3). In contrast to claims over borders and what 
constitutes the nation-state, internal territorialization designates the allocation of resources within 
recognized state boundaries. Imperial maps of the South Pacific functioned as a means of 
internal territorialization while acting as a report on the utility of resources on the islands. They 
thus serve as a useful window into understanding the relationship between mapping and 
economic planning of overseas territories. 
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Notes 
 
1. In the voyages Enomoto sponsored in 1882 and 1883, maps of the ocean and islands in South 
Pacific were made. However, systematic mapping of the islands themselves did not occur. 
2. The British quickly retracted this request upon learning that German submarines had been 
recalled to the Atlantic theater. Nevertheless, Tokyo used this opportunity as a means of entering 
World War I on the side of the Allies, citing their obligation to uphold the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance of 1902. In the official declaration of war, Japan stated that Germany, from their leased 
territory in China, had “infested East Asia with their ships.” The Japanese government and navy 
quickly moved beyond the confines of Britain’s request and occupied the German colonies in the 
South Pacific, namely the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands, by 1915. They, once again, 
cited the need to rid the menace of German U-Boats from Asia (Yamada 1997, 156) 
3. The other Class C mandates were German West Africa (present day Namibia), the Union of 
South Africa, New Guinea, and Western Samoa. 
4. Writing in 1944, Huntington Gilchrist noted that the request by the PMC for more information 
than what was in the annual report would have to be sent to the home government. The reply 
would not come back for another year (Gilchrist 1944, 638). This meant that pressing issues and 
criticisms of the mandate power’s actions could not be addressed in a timely or efficient manner. 
Moreover, the league sought to limit the PMC’s power by refusing fact-finding missions to the 
mandates. The council even ruled in 1923 at the behest of the British Colonial Office that 
complaints about a mandate power must be made by petitioners to the mandate power, which 
then would forward them to the PMC. 
5. During the 1920s, the United States in particular was concerned about whether Japan was 
illegally building bases in Micronesia. After looking at the available documents, I come to the 
same conclusion as Mark Peattie—namely that Tokyo did not sanction the construction of 
fortifications on the islands until after Japan had left the League of Nations in 1933. The 
construction of fortifications increased when relations with the United States deteriorated due to 
the ongoing war in China after 1937 (Peattie 1988, 248). 
6. The South Seas Government was in an ambiguous position in 1920. While the navy was 
ostensibly in charge of the islands, civilian control had already been established. Although the 
South Seas Government had to report to the naval ministry, civilian bureaucrats had been 
dispatched in 1918 to oversee the daily administration of the island. The South Seas Government 
would be formally established and placed under the oversight of the cabinet in 1922. 
7. Matsue Haruji, on the other hand, was the instrumental entrepreneur whose collaboration with 
the Nanyōchō would fundamentally shape the decision to utilize Japanese labor on the islands. 
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Born in Aizuwakamatsu City in Fukushima Prefecture in 1876, Matsue graduated from Tokyo 
Industrial College in 1899 and studied abroad at Louisiana State University, then known for its 
work in sugar cultivation. He first gained experience in the sugar industry by working as a 
factory manager for the Greater Japan Sugar Company’s refinery in Osaka. He left the company 
in 1907 to search for opportunities to start his own business. In 1920, he visited Saipan and 
thought that, despite the jungle foliage covering the ground, the soil would be amenable for 
growing sugarcane. He was further encouraged by the lucrative international market for sugar at 
the time. In 1919, sugar prices remained high, buoyed by the demand created by belligerent 
nations during World War I. Moreover, as Shioya Shichijuro in his biography of Matsue noted, 
Matsue believed that sugar production on Saipan and the Marianas could compete with and 
potentially outstrip that of Taiwan. In his 1932 account of developing the islands, entitled Nanyō 
Kaitaku Jūnenshi (Ten years of development in the South Pacific), Matsue writes that he had a 
firm conviction in the eventual success of his enterprise even before it materialized (Matsue 
1932, 80; Shioya 2005, 73, 77). 
8. In addition to the South Seas Development Company, the other main Japanese company on 
the island was the South Seas Trading Company (Nanyō Bōeki Kabushiki Kaisha). Because the 
latter’s activities were concentrated primarily on coastal trade, it did not require much land to 
carry out its operation. As a result, most of the government-leased land was utilized by Nankō. 
On Saipan, Nankō’s center of production, the South Seas Government wrote that most of the 
land used to grow sugarcane was actually leased by it. Moreover, it did not begin to collect rent 
on these lands until October 1930 (Nanyōchō 1932, 333–334). 
9. The South Seas Government was not fiscally self-sufficient until 1935. From 1922 to 1935, it 
required an average of 4.76 million yen annually from the cabinet in Tokyo (Nanyōchō 1932, 
79–89). 
10. These maps were labeled as “top secret.” The U.S. Army Maps Service acquired these maps 
following World War II. They can be found at various library collections in the United States, 
particularly the Library of Congress in Washington, DC. 
11. The map showing monthly temperature averages in the South Pacific is not included in this 
paper (Nihon rikuchi sokuryō 1938). 
12. For an excellent history of the debate on the policy of southern expansion, see Yano (2009). 
13. Other advocates of southern expansion included Nitobe Inazo, Japan’s representative at the 
League of Nations and former professor of colonial studies at Tokyo University, and Goto 
Shimpei. In an essay in 1907, Nitobe wrote, “I believe that the folklore of Momotarō’s overseas 
expedition represents correct Japanese interest in the outside world, and their marching spirit. 
The Island of Ogres is the general name for the south seas islands.... With the southward advance 
of the Japanese, what is signified by the Island of Ogres moves southward too. In 1895, Taiwan 
was the Island of Ogres.... In five or ten years...Momotarō of today will expand to conquer 
toward [sic] the Island of Ogres further south” (Kimitada 1995, 128). 
14. The term nanyō was used ambiguously during the prewar period. Literally translated as the 
“south seas,” depending on the context, nanyō could refer to either the South Seas mandate or 
Southeast Asia. 
15. According to Chih-Ming Ka, Japanese sugar companies established large-scale sugar mills 
after 1906 and used their access to capital from Japanese banks to advance lower interest rate 
loans to sugarcane farmers. They were aided by the colonial government, which promoted the 
farming of sugarcane through irrigation and land reclamation projects. In addition, by 1921, over 
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25 million yen of subsidies to purchase machinery and seedlings had been given to Japanese 
sugar companies to offset the price of foreign sugar. 
16. For an examination of sugar plantations, see Mintz (1985, 19–73). 
17. The system of land tenure in Taiwan meant that Japanese sugar companies and the colonial 
government could not simply confiscate property to build factories or plantations. Sugar 
companies instead were obligated to purchase land to build factories and contract Taiwanese 
farmers to grow sugarcane. For more information on the land tenure system in Taiwan, see Ka’s 
description (1995, 27–34). 
18. The other company operating on the island at the time was the South Seas Trading Company 
(Nanyō Bōeki Kaisha). Because the South Seas Trading Company served as local merchants who 
sold Japanese goods to Micronesians in exchange for copra, their operations only required 
storage facilities near the major ports on the islands. As a result, the South Seas Development 
Company became the main beneficiary of land grants from the South Seas Government. 
19. Farmers who came without their families were given 3.25 acres (Decker 1940, 181). 
20. Takekoshi Yosaburō triumphantly proclaimed that “now Korea has room for ten million 
immigrants and Formosa [Taiwan] two million” (Peattie 1988, 89). 
21. The rate of migration to the South Pacific mandate grew exponentially following 1929. 
22. Jun Uchida has pointed out that the colonial government in Korea and Japanese business 
interests both encouraged and fostered ties with Korean business elites. In Taiwan, collaboration 
between Japanese entrepreneurs and Chinese elites occurred in the suppression campaigns 
against aborigines. They continued in the establishment of a salt monopoly and other enterprises 
(Chang and Meyers 1963, 440–444; Uchida 2005, 159–160). 
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